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Since the late 1980s Vietnam has made remarkable progress in transition from a former 
closed command economy to a market economy and in terms of integration into the world 
economy. With a slow and hesitant start following the announcement of doi moi (renovation) 
policy in 1986, significant reforms were undertaken in the first half of the 1990s. The reform 
process lost momentum during 1996-98, perhaps reflecting complacency resulting from the 
success of the initial reforms, and also due to economic uncertainty created by the 1997–98 
East Asian financial crisis. There has, however, been a renewed emphasis on completing the 
unfinished reform agenda since about 1999. The key reform measures so far include 
widespread reforms in the agricultural sector, involving a move away from the previous 
collective regime to a system in which farmers have greater freedom in making production 
decisions and marketing their produce; dismantling quantitative import restrictions on all 
products except sugar and petroleum products; significant tariff reforms leading to notable 
reduction in both the level and dispersion of effective rate of protection; initiatives to expose 
public sector enterprises to greater market discipline; relaxing restrictions on foreign direct 
investment, particularly in export-oriented projects; and lifting restrictions on private-sectors 
participation in foreign trade and the setting up of business ventures by private entities (both 
individuals and companies). These reform initiatives have been accompanied by sweeping 
macroeconomic policy reforms, including the unification and realignment of the exchange 
rate, liberalization of agricultural prices, relaxation of exchange controls, and a firm 
commitment to fiscal prudence.  
   The purpose of this chapter is to examine the implications of market-oriented policy 
reforms in Vietnam for incentives faced by farmers in the context of changes in the overall 
structure of incentives for private sector activities in the economy. The analysis is undertaken 
against the backdrop of an analytical narrative of agricultural policy evolution and key policy 
trends dating back to the command economy era. The empirical analysis of agricultural 
incentives covers six major products — paddy/rice, sugar, pigmeat, poultry, rubber and  
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coffee — using data for the period from 1986 (the earliest post-reform year for which the 
required data are available) to 2004. The six covered products account for more than two-
thirds of total value of agricultural production in Vietnam during the period under study. The 
chapter aims to inform the contemporary policy debate on reforming the structure of 
incentives for domestic agriculture in Vietnam, as an integral part of the country’s endeavour 
to accelerate its economic integration into the world economy.  
The study has four main parts. The next section presents an overview of growth and 
structural changes during the post reform era (since the mid-1980s), with emphasis on the 
relative importance of the agricultural sector, and the trends and compositional shifts in 
agricultural output and trade. The following section provides an overview of the origins, key 
elements and the progress in meeting reform commitments, with emphasis on the political 
economy of policy making. Following this, the analytical core of the chapter examines the 
trends and patterns of incentives to domestic agriculture using a set of incentive indicators 
based on the methodology in Anderson et al. (2008). The final section summaries the key 
findings and their policy implications.  
 
 
Agriculture in the Vietnamese economy 
 
 
The extraordinary economic growth performance of this transforming economy is first 





During the era of central planning (from the mid-1950s in the North and following unification 
in 1975 in the South), the Vietnamese economy was not subject to the same level of ‘forced 
industrialization’ as the former centrally planned economies in the Soviet block and China. 
The prolonged military conflict with the South Vietnamese regime and the USA constrained 
engineering an industrial transformation beyond setting up industries in line with the 
priorities of the war economy. Thus, agriculture continued to remain the dominant sector of 
the economy up to the 1980s. During the period 1955–85, the share of agriculture (broadly 
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defined to include farming, fisheries and forestry) in GDP fluctuated in the range of 38 to 52 
percent without showing any clear trend (GSO 2001).  By the mid-1980s, over 72 percent of 
the total labor force was engaged in agricultural pursuits (Riedel 1993, Table 6).  
The process of collectivization of agriculture in North Vietnam (the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam, DRV) was completed by the early 1960s. The forced replacement of a 
semi-subsistent peasant commodity production system by ‘the plan’ ushered in an era of 
suppressed growth, if not stagnation, in agriculture. During most of the ensuing three 
decades, agricultural output in the North was only barely sufficient to meet domestic 
consumption requirements. Attempts to replicate the collectivised system following the 
administrative unification of the country in 1976 resulted in severe disruption in agricultural 
production in the South. Piecemeal reforms implemented during 1979–80, with a view to 
relaxing structures of central planning, had only limited impact in containing output 
contraction. By the mid-1980s, large areas of the country experienced near-famine 
conditions, and food shortages resulted in widespread suffering. National food security 
became a leading preoccupation at that time (Pritchett 2003; White 1985; Riedel and Comer 
1997). 
The response of agriculture to market-oriented policy reforms initiated in the late 
1980s was remarkably swift. Between 1988 and 1992, GDP increased by 27 percent, with 
nearly 30 percent of this increase coming directly from agriculture. In addition, rapid 
agricultural growth also contributed to expansion in nonagricultural rural services and in 
input supplying and food processing industries. During the ensuing years, growth turned out 
to be broad based, with industry and services growing at much faster rates compared to 
agriculture. Nonetheless, the growth rate of agriculture continued to remain impressive (in the 
range of 3.0 to 5.2 percent per year), compared to both Vietnam’s own pre-crisis experience 
and the average performance of other low-income and transition economies. Despite notable 
structural change over the past one-and-a-half decades, agriculture still has a significant 
weight in the Vietnamese economy, contributing 21 percent of GDP and absorbing 57 percent 
of the total labor force of the nation in 2005 (Figure 1). Just over two-thirds of households in 
the lowest income quintile were occupied in agriculture in 2004, and almost three-fifths of 
the incomes of household in that income bracket was generated by agricultural activities 
(compared to less than one-fourth for the highest income quintile). 
Impressive agricultural growth, in particular the surge of paddy production, played a 
key role in winning political support for further reforms by ensuring national food security, a 
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source of much political anxiety in the 1980s. Agricultural growth was also at the heart of 
Vietnam’s success in rapid reduction in rural poverty. Growth of rural income helped 
economic transition by ameliorating pressure for rural to urban migration, despite a widening 
gap between urban and rural incomes. Unlike China, in Vietnam internal migration has so far 
been as much from one rural area to another as from countryside to the city. This has limited 
the pressure for heavy expenditure on urban development  (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003, 
Minot and Golettei 2000).  
 
Production of major commodities 
 
Paddy/rice was the prime mover of agricultural growth in the immediate post-reform period. 
From the mid-1990s there has been notable diversification of agricultural production into 
other food crops (maize, peanuts, and soybean), cash crops (in particular rubber, coffee, and 
tea, cashews, pepper, and cinnamon), fruits and vegetables, marine and aquaculture products 
(shrimps, fish, cuttlefish and crab), and animal husbandry (pigmeat and poultry). In 
agricultural cash crops, such as coffee, cashews and pepper, Vietnam moved from negligible 
production to being a major player in world markets. The initial production expansion of 
some cash crops (particularly rubber) reflected a return from state farm investment in the 
1980s, but growth of agricultural production during the post-reform era came predominantly 
from private smallholder production.  
Rice, the staple food of the country, which accounts for three-quarters of the caloric 
intake of the population, is by far the most dominant product in Vietnamese agriculture. In 
2004, paddy accounted 57 percent of total cultivated land and 36 percent of total agricultural 
output in the country (Tables 1 and 2; Figure 2). The Red River Delta and the Mekong River 
Delta together account for more than two-thirds of national paddy production (with the latter 
accounting for more than half of the total national production), but paddy is also the prime 
food crop grown widely in all other parts of the country. Paddy production increased 
persistently from 19,225 thousand tons in 1990 to 36,149 thousand tons in 2005, at an annual 
compound growth rate of 4.2 percent. This impressive growth largely came from an 
improvement in yield per acre while the acreage under cultivation remained virtually 
unchanged (Appendix Table A1). Paddy yield increased from 2.8 to 4.9 tons/ha between 
1986 and 2005.  
Coffee, rubber and sugar cane are the three most important cash crops in Vietnam. In 
2004 coffee accounted for 3.8 percent of agricultural output, with sugar cane and rubber 
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respectively accounting for 3.4 percent and 2.3 percent. Coffee and rubber production is 
largely for export markets while the sugar industry predominantly produces to meet domestic 
demand. Coffee and sugar are predominantly small-holder crops. Rubber is mainly produced 
in farms owned by the General Rubber Corporation — a state owned enterprise (SOE) at the 
national level — or by SOEs at the provincial level. Cultivated area, production and yield of 
both rubber and coffee recorded impressive growth over the past one-and-a-half decades 
(Appendix Table A1). Sugar production  recorded a sudden jump in 1995 following the 
introduction of the ‘one-million-ton sugar pogram’, and continued to increase up to 1999. 
There has, however, been a mild downward trend, with significant fluctuation of annual 
production thereafter. Sugay yield increased from 396 quiltal/ha in 1986 to 553 in 2005. The 
area under sugarcane cultivation declined in recent years as a result of a switch by farmers to 
other crops, mostly to subsidiary food crops. Despite its relatively poor performance (or 
because of it), sugarcane production remains the most assisted agricultural activity in 
Vietnam (see below). In 1995, the government launched its ‘one-million-ton’ sugar program 
with the aims of achieving self-sufficiency in sugar by 2000 and of creating employment in 
the rural economy (Nguyen et al. 2006).  
The other cash crops that have recorded impressive growth during the post-reform era 
include cashew, groundnuts, tea and pepper. Vietnam is the world’s biggest producer of 
pepper, the third biggest producer of cashew nuts, the fifth largest producer of tea and the 
tenth largest producer of groundnuts in the world. However the combined share of these 
products in total agricultural GDP of the country still remains small (less than 3 percent).  
Livestock production has increased rapidly since the early 1990s, accounting for 
about 14 percent of agricultural value added by 2000 (IAPP 2001, as quoted in Nguyen and 
Grote 2004). Pigmeat is by far the most important livestock product (60 percent) followed by 
poultry (15 percent) and beef (8 percent). The share of pigmeat in agricultural value added 
increased from 6.4 percent during 1990–94 to 10 percent during 2000–04 (Table 1). 
Currently over 90 percent of pigmeat production is consumed domestically, but exports 




Primary products accounted for nearly a half of non-oil merchandise exports from Vietnam in 
the mid-1980s. This share increased further in the early years of the post-reform period as the 
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first positive response to reforms came from agricultural products, mostly rice. In 1998 
Vietnam became self sufficient in rice and then a net exporter. By 2005, rice exports peaked 
at 5.25 million tons, making Vietnam the third largest rice exporter in the world (after the US 
and Thailand). Over time the composition of agricultural exports has become increasingly 
diversified, with pepper, cashews, rubber, coffee and fish products recording impressive 
growth. From about the late 1990s, manufacturing exports have grown faster, resulting in a 
notable shift in the export composition away from primary products. However, agricultural 
products still accounted for over one-quarter of total non-oil merchandise exports by 2004 
(Table 3).
1  
Until about the mid-1990s, both rapid volume expansion and favorable price trends 
contributed to growth in export earnings from agricultural products (Figure 3). From then on, 
prices continued to decline, with the rate of decline intensifying in more recent years. Rapid 
volume expansion continued to compensate for the decline in prices until about 1998, to 
generate mild but positive growth in export earnings. However, the rate of growth in export 
earnings from agricultural products has persistently slowed over the past five years or so, 
reflecting mostly declining prices.  
 
 
The reform process: from plan to market 
 
 
Under the collective system of agriculture instituted in the North in the early 1960s, 
cooperatives were the key link between agricultural households and the national economic 
plan. As the prime institution to replace ‘the market’ by ‘the plan’, the agricultural 
cooperative was responsible for organizing deployment of the agricultural labor force, 
producing in accordance with plans approved by the central authorities, selling the surplus 
production to the state at state controlled prices, and implementing obligatory procurement 
quotas introduced from time to time for sales to the state of a number of essential 
commodities (White 1981).  
                                                 
1 It is important to note here that export shares estimated in ‘gross terms’ (that is, estimates done using the 
published trade data without adjusting for the import content) tend to understate the balance of payments 
implications of agricultural exports particularly because most of the newly emerging manufactured exports are 
highly import dependent for their inputs.  
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Following the defeat of the government of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) 
in 1975 and the formal administrative reunification of the economy in 1976, replacing ‘the 
market’ by ‘the plan’ in the South presented a formidable challenge. In the period 
immediately following reunification, the approach to bring Southern agriculture under the 
collective system was fairly cautious. However, the rapid growth of private trade, combined 
with concerns about political resistance to socialist transformation in the southern farmers 
and the business community (dominated by ethnic Chinese) led to attempts to accelerate the 
process. The Second Party Plenum in July 1977 set ambitious targets to speed collectivization 
of individual agricultural households. Farmers’ resistance to the introduction of the collective 
system, coupled with a state of uncertainty about the future direction of reforms, resulted in 
declines in agricultural output. Consequently the process of collectivization in the South was 
slowed or even reversed, and agreements were reached on the need to decentralize decision 
making and to provide improved incentives for increased production though private 
(household) initiatives (Duiker 1989; Fford and de Vylder 1996; Naughton 1996).  
The reforms introduced during 1979–80 included institution of ‘production contracts’, 
under which cooperatives subcontracted land to households and allowed households greater 
latitude in production decision making. Under this new system, which was similar to the 
‘household responsibility system’ in China, households were allowed to keep, or to sell on 
the free market, any surplus above a stipulated amount to be delivered to cooperatives under 
the contract. In effect, the role of cooperatives was limited to a subsidiary role of allocating 
land, supplying inputs, and providing technical assistance (Woodside 1989).  
These reforms had an immediate and dramatic effect: total agricultural production (at 
1994 prices) went from 37 trillion VND in 1979 to 46 trillion VND in 1982  (GSO 2001). But 
rather than responding to improved production by deepening reforms, as China did, Vietnam 
back peddled from the reform process for most of the rest of the decade. The emergence in 
the early 1980s of severe macroeconomic imbalances, reflected in high and rising inflation, 
undermined the reform movement. Not only were the macroeconomic problems interpreted 
as a symptom of the failure of reforms, but also they created dissatisfaction in the ranks of 
civil servants because they resulted in a reduction in their real wages,. Thus, the influence of 
‘hardliners’ in the Communist Party of Vietnam gained strength by the mid-1980s, 
intensifying the pressure to force collectivization of agriculture in the south (Riedel and 
Comer 1997).  
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By the mid-1980s, the economy was stagnating amidst hyperinflation and a chronic 
balance of payments situation. Furthermore, it was clear by 1988 that Soviet aid would soon 
decline. In the face of these problems, a more concerted push toward reform was announced 
at the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in December 1986 (CPV 1994).  
The implementation of this program of reform, referred to as doi moi, did not, however, 
really gain momentum until the collapse of the Soviet Union which virtually put an end to 
Soviet aid. Massive contraction in agricultural output in 1988, which brought near-famine 
conditions in many parts of the country, also played a role in ameliorating resistance to 
reform. The focus of early reform was mainly on unshackling agriculture. The reform process 
largely ignored the private sector outside of agriculture initially, and the process of 
establishing the institutions needed to support private sector activity outside of agriculture 
began with unrest only from about early 1990s. 
 
Unshackling agriculture  
 
The transition to a more decentralised, market-oriented system of agricultural production 
began with the adoption of the Decree No.10 by the Communist Part of Vietnam in 1988. 
This recognized the peasant household, rather than the cooperative, as the basic unit in the 
agrarian structure. It gave households the right to conditional use of private land for a period 
of 10–15 years, the ability to own their own draft animals, farm tools and other equipment, 
barter output for inputs, and the ability to retain income earned from production after paying 
a modest tax. However, at that stage, cooperatives continued to have ultimate control of land 
and water resources, and sale of output (at state prices) remained restricted to the district. 
Further measures introduced in 1989 reduced the direct involvement of the state in input 
allocation. In July 1993, tenure over agricultural land was extended to 20 years and farmers 
were permitted to sell, lease, exchange, mortgage, and bequeath land. Cooperatives were still 
meant to provide a focus for various rural activities sponsored by the state but, in the majority 
of communes, the cooperatives were reduced to only a minor role: their functions were to act 
as local tax collectors, as the holders of residual property rights, and as an element of the 
formal state structure  (Riedel 1993, Riedel and Comer 1997, Sachs and Woo 1994).  
Land tenure reforms were accompanied by sweeping domestic market (price) reforms. 
In 1987 and 1988, the rationing system was abolished for many commodities, and official 
prices of non-essential goods were raised to a level close to free market prices. 
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Administrative prices of most consumer goods, and a large number of agricultural and 
industrial inputs, were abolished. In June 1990 procurement of farm products by the state 
(usually at prices below the free market) formally ended, allowing farmers to sell their 
produce at market price. By 1990, commodity prices were largely determined by domestic 
market conditions, and direct subsidies were eliminated. The former sellers’ market was 
replaced with the shift towards market-clearing prices. The weakening of the state trading 
system at the local level permitted private traders to develop local markets, while many state 
trading enterprises became more responsive to market opportunities. International trade in 
agricultural products was also gradually liberalized from 1989, allowing private sector 
participation at successive stages. 
 
Trade policy reforms 
 
In conjunction with domestic market (price) reforms, foreign trade and investment regimes 
were considerably liberalized in successive stages. The Law on Import and Export Duties 
introduced on 1 January 1988 marked the beginning of the present trade tax system. The 
original import tariff schedule was replaced in 1992 by a detailed, consolidated schedule 
based on the Harmonised System (HS) of tariff nomenclature. During the ensuing years of 
the decade the tariff structure was fine-tuned, reflecting a trend towards an increasingly 
selective protection of consumer goods (cosmetics and some categories of food products), 
upstream activities related to textiles and garments (silk, cotton, and certain fibres) and some 
specifically protected intermediate goods (metal products, cements and glass). Following 
accession to the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1995, and in preparation for the WTO 
accession, steps were taken to restructure and rationalise the tariff structure in the early- and 
mid-2000s (Thanh 2006). 
After one-and-a-half decades of reforms, tariffs are now the major instruments used in 
regulating import trade. The average (import-weighted) import duty rate declined from 22 
percent in 1999 to 13.6 percent in 2004 (Figure 2). The maximum tariff rate (at the six-digit 
level of the Harmonised System, HS) came down from 200 percent in 1997 to 120 percent in 
2001 and then to 113 percent in 2004. As at October 2005, less that one percent of total tariff 
lines (accounting for around 4 percent of import value) have tariff rates above 50 percent. 
About one-third of the tariff lines have zero tariffs. Despite notable efforts to rationalise the 
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tariff structure, tariffs in Vietnam are still relatively high and non-uniform by regional 
standards (Athukorala 2006).
2  
Tariff rates are generally higher for manufacturing compared to agriculture and other 
primary product sectors. By mid-2003, the weighted average duty rate on manufacturing 
imports was 29 percent, compared to 11 percent and 3.6 percent on agricultural and mineral 
products. Within manufacturing, tariff rates are particularly high for food processing and for 
certain consumer goods, notably garments, footwear, ceramic products and leather goods 
(Athukorala 2006, Appendix Table 1).  
By 2004 only two products, namely sugar and petroleum, remained under quantitative 
restrictions (import licensing). As part of the trade reform commitment for WTO accession 
the government offered to replace import licensing on sugar by a WTO-consistent tariff trade 
quota system. Imports of two products — poultry eggs (0407) and raw tobacco (2401) — are 
already subject to tariff-rate quotas. The current list of prohibited imports includes military 
equipment, toxic chemicals, antiquities, narcotics, firecrackers, poisonous toys, used 
consumer goods, and right-hand driving automobiles. In addition, a considerable number of 
import items (eg pharmaceuticals, some chemicals, some food items, fertilizer, and recording 
and broadcasting equipment) still require approval from relevant ministries. By 2000, around 
10 percent of imports (in value terms) were subject to this form of regulation. As in many 
other countries, these regulations are generally maintained for heath and security reasons and 
they do not seem to greatly distort trade patterns. 
At the initial stage of market-oriented reforms, the Vietnamese government 
introduced export duties on a number of export items. They were justified at the time on 
grounds of raising revenue, protecting the environment, natural resources conservation and 
reserve inputs for domestic production. Most of these duties were subsequently eliminated. 
By 1998 only a few products — iron ore, crude oil, scrap metal, raw cashews — were subject 
to export duties. Currently export prohibition applies only to environmentally sensitive 
products: agro-forestry products, round wood and saw wood from domestic natural forests, 
firewood and charcoal from domestic naturally-grown forestry wood, and rare wild animals. 
When Vietnam began exporting rice in 1989, rice exporting was subject to licensing, 
with a view to ensuring adequate domestic supplies and reducing price volatility in the 
                                                 
2 By mid-2003, the average (unweighted) tariff rate in Vietnam (16.7) is a little lower compared to China (17.5) 
and Thailand (18.5), but much higher compared to Indonesia (8.43), Malaysia (10.2) and the Philippines (7.6). 
The degree of dispersion of tariff rates (measured by the coefficient of variation) in Vietnam is much higher 
compared to China, the Philippine and Thailand, and lower compared to Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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domestic market. Export quotas were issued to only a limited number of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). the number varied between 15 and 40. Intense political lobbying among 
SOEs to receive export quotas during the early years of rice exporting suggested that export 
quotas were in fact binding and ensured the domestic price was below the relevant border 
price. However, from about 1998, quotas turned out to be virtually ineffective, in line with 
rapid expansion of rice production and marketable surplus. On 4 April 2001, the rice export 
quota allocation mechanism (together with the import quota system for fertilizer) was 
abolished by Prime-Ministerial Decision No. 46/2001/QD-TTg. According to the Decision, 
enterprises were permitted to export rice provided they held general business licences for 
trading in rice or other agricultural products. In connection with exporting rice to countries 
with which the government of Vietnam has signed bilateral trading agreements, the Ministry 
of Trade assigns export rights to selected enterprises in consultation with the Vietnam Food 
Association. However, such trade is too small to have any impact on the operation of 




Reforms in domestic agriculture and in foreign trade were accompanied by significant 
macroeconomic policy reforms (Dollar 1992, Dollar and Ljunggren 1997). To fight inflation, 
interest rates were raised to very high levels. The government also tried to curb deficit 
financing, which required a large fiscal adjustment, including the release of 500,000 soldiers 
from the military and sharp cuts in subsidies to SOEs. These policy measures, combined with 
some revenue windfalls from petroleum operations coming on line, brought the budget deficit 
from 11.4 percent of GDP in 1989 to below 4 percent in 1992, a level which has not been 
surpassed since. Fiscal adjustment and monetary restraint were successful in bringing the 
inflation rate from over 160 percent per annum in 1988 to less than 10 percent by the mid-
1990s.  
Exchange rates were unified and a new rate was sharply devalued in 1989. The 
resultant real exchange rate devaluation amounted to 72.5 percent, according to IMF 
calculations (Dollar 1992). Since then, the Vietnamese Dong has been on a managed floating 
exchange rate regime in which the State Bank of Vietnam (The Central Bank) determines the 
unified rate in line with foreign exchange trading on the market. During 1990–98, the gap 
between the official exchange rate and the exchange rate in the inter-bank market varied in 
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the range of 5 to 10 percent. Since then the State Bank’s approach to managing the exchange 
rate has been more flexible, reducing the gap between the two rates to more than 0.1 percent 
on a given business day. The black market premium on the dollar, which remained over 50 
percent during 1988–95, has come down sharply to less than 5 percent by 2004 (Appendix 
Table A4). Reflecting successful macroeconomic stabilization and exchange rate 




Trends and patterns of agricultural incentives 
 
 
This section provides an analysis of the changing extent and patterns of direct and 
indirect distortions to incentives faced by domestic agriculture in Vietnam using the 
methodology developed by Anderson et al. (2008). The main focus of the present study’s 
methodology is on government-imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices 
and what they would be under free markets. Since it is not possible to understand the 
characteristics of agricultural development with a sectoral view alone, the project’s 
methodology not only estimates the effects of direct agricultural policy measures but it also 
includes estimates of distortions in non-agricultural tradable sectors for comparative 
evaluation. Specifically, Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs) for farmers are computed for 
six covered products, plus NRAs for nonagricultural tradables for use with that for 
agricultural tradables to calculate a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA). Non-covered 
agricultural exportable products are assumed to have the same NRA as the average NRA for 
covered exportables, while the NRA for import-competing non-covered products is assumed 
to be one-tenth that for sugar (and it is assumed the NRA for nontradables is zero and their 
share of non-covered farm production is 68 percent while the exportables’ share is 25 
percent). 
The NRA to nonagricultural tradables is estimated by assuming the implicit duty rate 
on nonagricultural importable products (total tariff revenue from nonagricultural imports 
divided by the value of nonagricultural imports) is the distortion to that component of 
nonagricultural tradable GDP, and that the rest of nonagricultural tradable GDP (exportables, 
assumed to be three-quarters as large as the import-competing part) is not subject to any 
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export taxes or subsidies. In estimating tradable GDP we follow the approach in Goldstein 
and Officer (1979),  which is to treat construction, utilities and all services in national 
accounts (at the two digit level) as non-tradables.  
Before examining the estimates, it is important to bear in mind two important caveats 
arising from the paucity of data. First, we have ignored potential differences between border 
(reference) prices and domestic prices arising from qualify differences. This would have 
possibly infused an underestimation bias into our calculations. Secondly, we have assumed 
complete passthrough of changes in producer (wholesale) prices into farm-gate prices, 
potentially resulting in an upward bias in estimates. These limitations are, however, important 
only in comparing the level of distortion on incentives among products or across countries at 
a given point in time. They are unlikely to distort inferences based on inter-temporal 
comparison (changes in incentives over time) because the magnitude of the bias is less likely 
to be time variant. It is also important to note that RRA estimates, by nature of the estimation 
method, do not fully capture indirect distortions to agricultural incentives arising from 
changes in tariffs on tradable inputs. Given the cascading nature of Vietnam’s tariff structure, 
this is a potentially important source of downward bias in RRA estimates (Athukorala 2006). 
Nor are distortions from non-tariff import restrictions captured here. 
The estimated distortion rates are summarised in the form of five-year averages in 
Tables 4 and 5, and plotted in Figure 6. (Detailed annual estimates are reported in Appendix 
Tables A5 and A6. The estimated NRA series for each of the covered products, together with 
the related domestic and border price series, are depicted in Appendix Figure A1.) 
Throughout the latter 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the policy regime in Vietnam was 
characterised by a significant bias against agriculture. The RRA averaged -20 percent in 
1990-94. Direct negative assistance to agriculture (as measured by NRA for agriculture) 
underpinned this high degree of distortion to agricultural incentives. The main factors that 
kept domestic prices artificially suppressed relative to border prices were the continued 
dominance of SOEs in the trading and processing of agricultural commodities, a stringent 
export licensing system relating to rice trade and other trade restrictions, administered prices 
which were usually maintained below border prices, and perhaps a lack of experience of 
newly merging private traders operating in a competitive trading environment.  
 
Until the mid 1990s  the four exportable agricultural products - rice, coffeee, pigmeat 
and poltry - faced significant negative assistance (Table 4). Rubber was unique among the 
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five exportable products: it enjoyed  positive assistance over the past two decades reflecting 
production subsidies given to the state-owned planation companies which account for the 
bulk of rubber producion in the country.  With the removal of direct price intervention, some 
export duties, and the liberalization of export trade, incentives for rice, pigmeat and poltry 
improved significantly from the mid-1990s..  Eeven though  coffee production continued to 
remain  disprotected, the overall NRA index for exportable agriculture  increased persistently 
in the ensuing years: from around -25 percent in 1990–94 to around 20 percent in 2000–04.    
  
Sugar, the only import-competing product covered in the study,  occupies a unique 
position both in terms of the level and trend of assistance. Sugar cane producers enjoyed 
exceptionally high NRAs compared to those producing other products, and the measured 
degree of assistance increased persistently over time. During 2000–04, the NRA for sugar 
cane was 160 percent, compared to a weighted average of 20 percent for all covered products. 
This pattern points to the stringency of the existing licensing regime governing sugar imports. 
Sugar protection policy in Vietnam was systematically analysed in a number of recent studies 
(eg. CIE 2001; Nguyen et al. 2006). The consensus inferences arising from these studies are 
that the government’s sugar industry development strategy — enshrined in the ‘One Million 
Ton of Sugar Program’ launched in 1995 — has turned out to be a dismal failure and that a 
competitive, economically viable sugar industry cannot be developed through isolation from 
world market conditions. Heavy protection provided to the sugar industry is a major 
constraint in the diversification of scarce land resources to more dynamic, export-oriented 
crops. Moreover, high domestic sugar prices not only tax domestic consumers but also 
hamper the competitiveness of domestic confectionary, food and beverage industries. 
Improvement in NRA for exportable agriculture, coupled with continued high NRA 
enjoyed by sugar cane producers,  have brought about a a notable improvement in the RRA 
for agriculture over the past ten years.  Interestingly this improvenemnt in relative insentivel 
to agriculture has taken place against the backdrop  of a persistent increase in the NRA to 
nonagriculture over time (Table 5, Figure 6).  Clerly  dismantling of  various direct price 
intervention in domestic trade, removal of export duties on almost all agricultural products, 
liberalization of import trade and exchange rate reforms have been instrumental in redressing 
the anti-agricultural bial in the incentive structure of the Vietnamese economy.  
A comparison of the weighted average NRA for the exportables (paddy/rice, rubber, 
coffee, pigmeat and rice) with that for sugar cane (an import-competing product) 
points to a persistent bias in agricultural incentives in favor of import-competing, as 
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against export-oriented production within agriculture (Table 4). However, this 
comparison needs to be qualified by the fact that the NRA for import-competing 
products is comprised of only sugar protection, which is an outlier relative to other 






Over the past two decades, Vietnam has made significant progress in market-oriented 
reforms. The foreign trade regime has been increasingly liberalized, with a palpable transition 
from quantitative restraints to tariffs as the main instrument for regulating imports. Export 
taxes on all significant products have been eliminated. In domestic trade, SOE dominance in 
most areas has ended and all price controls and restrictions on production and movements of 
goods have been eliminated. The reform process is far from complete, however. The structure 
of trade protection still remains out of line with that of the major trading nations in the region, 
both in terms of the level and the dispersion of nominal and effective protection rates. High 
import duties on a number of agricultural products in which Vietnam has a clear comparative 
advantage — in particular rice, coffee and tea — and stringent quantitative import restrictions 
on sugar are major anomalies in the import trade regime. A number of intermediate goods, 
including crucial inputs to agriculture, which are locally produced by SOEs, have excessively 
high tariffs. Had information on them been available for inclusion in the above analysis, the 
NRA for agriculture would have been even lower. Export licensing for rice, although 
seemingly non-binding for some time now, remains an important source of uncertainty for 
private-sector traders.   
Market oriented reforms in Vietnam began with attempts to unshackle domestic 
agriculture, and reforms in this areas have been wide-ranging compared to those in other 
areas. The predominance of agriculture in the pre-reform economy — its importance in 
determining the fortune of the economy and in maintaining the livelihood of the vast majority 
of people — made sweeping agricultural reforms politically palatable. Given the vast 
untapped potential of agriculture during the command-economy era, the response of 
agriculture to policy reforms was swift. The impressive reform outcome in agriculture played 




The empirical analysis of the trends and patterns of incentives to agriculture yields a 
number points worth stressing. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, the policy regime in 
Vietnam was characterised by a significant bias against agriculture. With the gradual removal 
of privileges enjoyed by SOEs in procuring, processing and trading of agricultural products, 
the opening up of both domestic and foreign trade to the private sector, and the nascent 
private sector’s emergence in a competitive trading environment, this policy bias dissipated 
over time. By 2000–04, the total nominal rate of assistance to agriculture and the degree of 
anti-agricultural bias embodied in the overall policies affecting tradables showed that the bias 
had in fact reversed. Interestingly, the improvement in relative incentives for agriculture was 
predominantly, if not solely, from direct agricultural reforms:. This is evidenced by the only 
mild increase in the nominal rate of assistance to nonagricultural tradables. In this context, 
the implementation of tariff reform commitments following accession to the WTO has the 
potential to play a vital role in consolidating Vietnam’s reform effort to remove remaining 
sectoral policy biases.  
According to the commodity-level estimates, excessive assistance provided to sugar 
producers (mainly though stringent quantitative restrictions on sugar imports) remains the 
major anomaly in the incentive structure. Over the past five years, nominal rate of assistance 
continued to be high, despite a persistent decline in border prices, reflecting the stringency of 
the existing quantitative restrictions. Heavy protection provided to this industry is a major 
constraint on the diversification of agriculture into dynamic export-oriented crops. High 
domestic sugar prices not only tax domestic consumers but also hamper the competitiveness 
of domestic confectionary, food and beverage industries. Redressing this anomaly in the 
incentive structure remains a formidable challenge because sugar cane has long been a 
‘choice crop’ of the government’s rural development and agricultural diversification 
programs. Unfortunately the Vietnamese authorities have missed the opportunity to make use 
of its WTO accession commitments to face up to the political resistance to reform. Instead, 
the government has chosen the soft option of replacing the existing sugar important licensing 
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Figure 1: Growth of GDP and agricultural value added, and agricultural share in GDP, 
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Figure 2: Agricultural production shares by farm products, at undistorted prices, Vietnam, 




















































Figure 3: Agricultural export volume, value and price indices, Vietnam, 1990 to 2004 
 
































































































































































































Figure 5: Real exchange rate index, Vietnam, 1988 to 2005  
 












































































































Figure 6: Nominal rates of assistance to all nonagricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance



































































































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradable parts of the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet and Appendix Table A6
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Table 1: Share of agriculture in GDP and composition of agricultural output,





1986-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
  
Share of agriculture in GDP  42 34 26  23
       
Composition of agricultural output:    
Rice na 46.6 45.4  35.7
Rubber na 1.6 2.0  2.3
Coffee na 2.1 5.2  3.8
Sugar na 3.5 4.4  3.4
Pigmeat na 6.4 7.3  9.9
Other na 39.7 35.8  45.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
  
 
a At current prices, estimated by applying value added shares based on 2000 Input-Output table to 
gross output data.   
 









   1990 1995 2000 2004 
Paddy 66.8 64.5 60.6 56.6 
Maize 4.8 5.3 5.8 7.5 
Sugar 1.4 2.1 2.4 2.2 
Groundnut 2.2 2.5 1.9 2.0 
Soybean 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.4 
Tea 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9 
Coffee 1.3 1.8 4.4 3.8 
Rubber 2.5 2.7 3.3 3.4 
Pepper 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 
Coconut 2.3 1.6 1.3 1.0 
Total   100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
   
Total area (‘000 ha)  9040 10497 12644 13150 
 









 1990 1995 2000  2004 
Share of agricultural products in total 
non-oil exports 
80 46 25 22 
    
Composition of agricultural exports:     
 Groundnut  na 3.7 2.3  0.9 
 Rubber  4.7 12.0 9.4  20.5 
 Coffee  7.3 37.4 28.4  22.0 
 Tea   0.6 0.8 4.0  3.3 
 Rice  80.2 40.7 37.8  32.7 
 Cashew  3.8 9.8 9.5  15.0 
 Black pepper  3.5 4,5 8.3  5.2 
 Cinnamon  na na 0.3  0.3 
TOTAL   100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 
 




Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance to covered products, Vietnam, 1986 to 2004 
(percent) 
 
   1986-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
   
a Exportables -13.2 -27.2 -2.1 16.9 
Rice -2.8 -26.6 -0.4 22.9 
Rubber n.a. 21.2 18.6 16.8 
Coffee -49.4 -21.1 -7.1 -12.0 
Pigmeat -41.8 -37.5 -6.1 8.9 
Poultry -3.1 -3.6 3.7 1.6 
        
Import-competing products
a 49.6 112.9 160.2  n.a.
Sugar n.a. 49.6 112.9 160.2 
       
Total of covered products
a -13.2 -27.2 -0.2 20.6 
Dispersion of covered products
b 28.8 46.1 157.7 221.3 
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  70 67 76 63 
 
 
a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
 
b Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted 
mean of NRAs of covered products. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Table 5: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural industries, 
Vietnam, 1986 to 2004 
(percent) 
   1986-89 1990-94 1995-99  2000-04 
Covered products
a -13.2 -27.2 -0.2 20.6 
Non-covered products   -14.5 -25.0 0.3  22.3 
All agricultural products
a -14.0 -26.5 -0.1 21.2 
Non-product specific (NPS) assistance  0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
b Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS) -14.0 -26.5 -0.1 21.2 
Trade bias index
c -0.19 -0.17 -0.01 0.00 
    
Assistance to just tradables:    
   All agricultural tradables  -16.1 -26.4 0.0  20.7 
   All nonagricultural tradables  4.3 -11.2 1.5  20.8 
d Relative rate of assistance, RRA -19.4 -17.4 -1.3 0.0 
    
 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies. 
 
b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. 
Total of assistance to primary factors and intermediate inputs divided by total value of 
primary agriculture production at undistorted price, expressed as a percentage. 
 
c Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAag /100)/(1+NRAag x m/100) – 1, where NRAagm and 
NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and exportable parts of 
the agricultural sector. 
 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors, respectively.  
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
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Appendix Figure A1: Domestic price, border price and nominal rate of assistance for 
various farm products,




























































































































































Appendix Figure A1 (continued): Domestic price, border price and nominal rate of assistance 
for various farm products,



































































































































































































































Appendix Figure A1 (continued): Domestic price, border price and nominal rate of assistance 
for various farm products,














































































































a Domestic and border prices have been deflated by the nonagricultural implicit GDP deflator 
(1994 =100) 
 




Appendix Table A1: Planted area, production, and yield per hectare of selected agricultural 
products, Vietnam, 1990 to 2004 
 
  Paddy Maize  Sugar 
cane 
Groundnut Soybean Tea  Coffee  Rubber  Pepper 
(a) Planted area of crops (‘000 Ha)   
1990  6043 432  131 201 110 60 119 222 9
1991  6303 448  145 211 101 60 115 221 9
1992  6475 478  146 217 97 63 104 212 6
1993  6559 497  143 217 120 63 101 243 7
1994  6599 535  167 248 132 67 124 258 7
1995  6766 557  225 260 121 67 186 278 7
1996  7004 615  237 263 110 75 254 254 8
1997  7100 663  257 254 106 79 340 348 10
1998  7363 650  283 269 129 77 371 382 13
1999  7654 692  344 248 129 85 478 395 18
2000  7666 730  302 245 124 88 562 412 28
2001  7493 730  291 245 140 98 565 416 36
2002  7504 816  320 247 159 109 522 429 48
2003  7452 913  313 244 166 116 510 441 51
2004  7446 991  286 264 184 121 497 454 51
Prel  2005  7326 1043  266 270 204 118 491 480 49
      
(b) Production (‘000 tons)            
 Paddy  Maize  Sugar 
cane 
Groundnut Soybean Tea  Coffee  Rubber  Pepper 
1990  19225 671  5406 13 87 145 92 58 9
1991 19622 672  6162 236 80 149 100  65 9
1992 21590 748  6437 227 80 163 119  67 8
1993 22837 882  6083 259 106 170 136  97 8
1994 23528 1144  7550 294 124 189 180 129 9
1995 24964 1177  10711 335 126 181 218 125 9
1996 26397 1537  11430 358 114 211 317 143 11
1997 27524 1651  11921 351 113 235 421 187 13
1998 29146 1612  13844 386 147 255 427 194 16
1999 31394 1753  17760 318 147 317 553 249 31
2000 32530 2006  15044 355 149 315 803 291 39
2001 32108 2162  14657 363 174 340 841 313 44
2002 34447 2511  17120 400 206 424 700 298 47
2003 34569 3136  16855 406 220 449 794 364 69
2004 36149 3431  15649 469 246 514 836 419 73




Appendix Table A1 (cont): Planted area, production, and yield per hectare of selected 
agricultural products, Vietnam, 1990 to 2004 
 
 
(c) Yield per hectare         
 Paddy  Maize  Sugar 
cane 
Groundnut Soybean Tea  Coffee  Rubber  Pepper 
1990  3.2 1.6  41.3 1.1 0.8 2.4 0.8 0.3 0.9
1991  3.1 1.5  42.6 1.1 0.8 2.5 0.9 0.3 1.0
1992  3.3 1.6  44.0 1.0 n.a. 2.6 1.1 0.3 1.2
1993  3.5 1.8  42.4 1.2 0.9 2.7 1.3 0.4 1.1
1994  3.6 2.1  45.3 1.2 0.9 2.8 1.5 0.5 1.4
1995  3.7 2.1  47.6 1.3 1.0 2.7 1.2 0.4 1.3
1996  3.8 2.5  48.0 1.4 1.0 2.8 1.2 0.6 1.4
1997  3.9 2.5  46.4 1.4 1.1 3.0 1.2 0.5 1.3
1998  4.0 2.5  48.9 1.4 1.1 3.3 1.2 0.5 1.2
1999  4.1 2.5  51.6 1.3 1.1 3.7 1.2 0.6 1.8
2000  4.2 2.8  49.8 1.5 1.2 3.6 1.4 0.7 1.4
2001  4.3 3.0  50.4 1.5 1.2 3.5 1.5 0.8 1.2
2002  4.6 3.1  53.5 1.6 1.3 3.9 1.3 0.7 1.0
2003  4.6 3.4  53.8 1.7 1.3 3.9 1.6 0.8 1.4
2004  4.9 3.5  54.7 1.8 1.3 4.1 1.7 0.9 1.4
Prel 2005  4.9 3.6  55.3 1.8 1.4    
 
Source: GSO (various issues)  Appendix Table A2: Quantity, value and price of exports of major agricultural commodities, Vietnam, 1990 to 2004 
    1990 1991  1992  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  1999 2000 2001 2002  2003 2004 
Value ($ million)                          
Groundnut  --- 50 32 61 71  70  70  45 42 33  41  38  52 48  27 
Rubber  16  50  54  74  133 159 150 191  127  147 166 166 271  378 597 
Coffee  25  74  86  110  328 495 337 491  594  585 501 391 322  505 641 
Tea    2 14 16 26 30  25  29  48 50 45  70  78  83 58  96 
Rice  275  230  405  336  421 539 855 870  1,024  1,025 667 625 726  720 950 
Cashew  nut  13 26 41 44 59  130  76  133  117  110  167  152  210  277  436 
Black  pepper  12 18 15 14 26  39  47  67 65  137  146  91  110  105  152 
Cinnamon  --- --- --- --- ---  ---  7  7  4  5  6  6  6  5  8 
Index  (1990=100)  100 117 176 170 281  388  429  513 565 588  483  418  519 611  848 
Volume ('000 tons)                        
Groundnut  71 79 63  106  101  115  127  86 87 56  76  78  106 82  45 
Rubber  76  63  82  97  105 138 195 194  191  263 273 308 455  432 513 
Coffee  28  94  96  123  177 248 284 392  382  482 734 931 722  749 975 
Tea    2 10 13 21  17.3  19  21  33 33 36  56  68  77 59  99 
Rice  455 1,033 1,946 1,722 1,950 1988 3003 3575  3730  4508 3477 3721 3236  3810 4060 
Cashew  nut  25 30 52 48 57  20  17  33 26 18  34  44  62 82  105 
Black  pepper  9 16 22 20 20  18  25  25 15 35  36  57  78 74  112 
Cinnamon  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 6 3 3  1  3 4 4 5  5 8 
Index  (1990=100)  100  70 125 114 131  139  200  237 243 294  256  284  258 288  322 
(3) Unit value ($ per ton)                      
Groundnut  --- 629 510 573 700  608  551  540 484 594  538  486  488 587  603 
Rubber  211 795 659 765  1265  1151  1348  981 667 553  607  539  596 874  1163 
Coffee  893 791 896 896  1853  1995  1409  1261  1555  1213  683  420  445 674  658 
Tea    1000 1400 1231 1238  ---  ---  1397  1483 1521 1239  1251  1149  1078  996  961 
Rice  170 223 208 195 216  271  285  245 273 227  192  168  224 189  234 
Cashew  nut  520  867  788  917  1035 1000  582 4000  4565  5969 4892 3474 3398  3364 4148 
Black  pepper  1333  1104  673  750  850 2171 1846 2722  4286  3947 3943 1600 1399  1415 1362 
Cinnamon  ---  --- --- --- --- ---  2384  2204  1806  1531  1585  1590  1257  1080  977 
Index  (1990=100)  100 166 141 149 214  271  215  215 228 195  187  146  199 210  260 
Note:  * The index cover all products listed except ground nuts, cinnamon and tin (for which volume and/or value data are not available for all years) 
Source: Vietnam, General Department of Customs and GSO (unpublished data) Appendix Table A3: Prices
a for primary products, Vietnam, 1960 to 2005
1
  Rubber    Coffee   Sugar   Paddy/rice    Pigmeat 
  DP  BP DP BP DP BP DP  BP  DP  BP 
1990 8311  6857 4400  10110 2662 2425  916  2186  3114  6409 
1991 8721  11947 6000  12376 3803 3172 1748  3340  5613 10366 
1992 9982  13826 7000  13322 4072 3372 1501  3530  5661 11196 
1993 7433  12429 8500  14520 4548 3118 1607  3275  7366 10660 
1994  10993  16555  18000  31020 5953 3794 1892  3440  7937  8512 
1995  14462  22723  24000  40215 6537 4636 2602  4320  11460 10811 
1996  14462  15066  15500  15697 6303 4248 2836  3080  11320 11084 
1997  11784  12019  14500  15556 6711 4463 2738  2887  10280 18434 
1998  11248  9282  17500  21617 7120 4246 3221  3711  10564 15568 
1999  11034  8090  15600  17732 6523 2329 3299  3233  12196 12952 
2000  10176  9019  8958.3  10145 5032 2975 2818  2766  10935 13063 
2001  11355  8321  5186.2 6484 6450 3858 2842  2473  10217 13636 
2002  10680  9564  5770.3 7185 6631 3002 3096  3481  14243 11195 
2003  12124  14156  9531.4  10931 6364 2360 3404  2973  na  na 
2004  12853  14818  10050  11525 6854 2610 3891  3744  na  na 
2005  na  na  na  13585 7380 3509 4016  4326  na  na 
 
a DP = domestic price BP = border price     
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet using methodology from Anderson et al. (2008) Appendix Table A4: Foreign exchange rates,
a Vietnam, 1986 to 2005 
 
 Official  rate 
US$/Don ‘000  
Black rate 
US$/Don ‘000
RER, 2000= 100 
1986 0.02    0.05 n.a. 
1987      0.08   0.61 n.a. 
1988 0.61  3.44 64.0 
1989 4.46  4.98 274.1 
1990 6.48  9.80 261.7 
1991 10.04  15.17 232.2 
1992 11.20  16.93 194.0 
1993 10.64  16.08 157.5 
1994 10.97  16.57 131.9 
1995 11.04  16.68 120.3 
1996 11.03  11.14 106.0 
1997 11.68  12.25 100.3 
1998 13.27  13.91 94.5 
1999 13.94  14.62 98.2 
2000 14.17  14.85 100 
2001 14.73  15.44 94.8 
2002 15.28  16.02 93.0 
2003 15.47  16.22 95.2 
2004 15.70  16.46 97.2 
2005 15.82  n.a. 97.6 
 
a RER (Real exchange rate) = [NER*WPI]/DPI, where NER and WPI are respectively trade-weighted 
nominal exchange rate (domestic-currency price of foreign currency) and trade-weighted wholesale 
price indices for the ten major trading partner countries, and DPI is the Vietnamese GDP deflator. 
Trade weight used in compiling NER and WPI relate to the year 2000. By construct, an increase in 
RER reflects real depreciation.  
 
Sources: Official rate: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics(IFS) database;  
Black-market rate: International Currency Yearbook (various issues); RER: estimated using data 




Appendix Table A5: Annual nominal rates of assistance to covered agricultural products, 
Vietnam, 1986 to 2005 
 (percent) 
All 
covered     Coffee  Pigmeat  Poultry Rice Rubber Sugar 
-11 1986 -58  -47  -3 1 na na 
-28 1987 -74  -73  -3 -7 na na 
-3 1988 -36  -27  -3 2 na na 
-11 1989 -30  -22  -3 -7 na na 
-37 1990 -34  -52  -3 -37 92 26 
-24 1991 -27  -46  -4 -20 14 37 
-36 1992 -21  -50  -4 -35 -5 38 
-25 1993 -12  -32  -4 -25 5 67 
1994  -12 -8 -4 -16 0 80  -14
-6 1995 -10  5  -4 -8 1 61 
-3 1996 0 16  5 -7 2 79 
-6 1997 -2 -37  5 0 8 80 
-8 1998 -15  -22  6 -9 33 105 
1999  -8 8 6 22 50 239  21
14 2000 -7  -4  2 19 24 99 
20 2001 -16  -14  2 35 50 97 
14 2002 -16  45  2 4 23 160 
31 2003 -9  na  2 34 -6 218 
24 2004 na  na  2 22 -6 227 
12 2005 na  na  2 9 na 162 
 




Appendix Table A6: Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to 
exportable
b and import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural 















NRA     Inputs Outputs  RRA 
-15 -21  1986 0  -11 -16 -13 7 
-31 -35  1987 0  -28 -24 -27 6 
-7 -13  1988 0  -3 -11 -6 7 
-11 -9  1989 0  -11  -7 -10 -2 
-37 -26  1990 0  -37 -35 -37 -15 
-23 -17  1991 0  -24 -19 -23 -8 
-35 -22  1992 0  -36 -33 -35 -16 
-24 -15  1993 0  -25 -23 -24 -11 
-13 -7  1994 0  -14 -15 -14 -7 
-6 3  1995 0  -6  -7 -6 -8 
-3 5  1996 0  -3  -6 -3 -8 
-5 -8  1997 0  -6  0 -5 3 
-7 -6  1998 0  -8  -8 -8 -2 
21 -1  1999 0  21  22 21 23 
14 -2  2000 0  14  19 15 16 
21 -4  2001 0  20  33 24 27 
13 5  2002 0  14  5 11 8 
31 1  2003 0  31  33 32 31 
23 1  2004 0  24  22 23 22 
11 1  2005 0  12  9 11 11 
 
a NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the 
tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
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Appendix Table A7: Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered 
products, Vietnam, 1986 to 2005 
(percent) 
  Sugar Rice  Rubber  Coffee Pork  Chicken Covered 
Non-
covered 
69  1986 n.a.  51 n.a. 1 16 n.a. 31
71  1987 n.a.  48 n.a. 1 22 n.a. 29
68  1988 n.a.  57 n.a. 1 10 n.a. 32
71  1989 n.a.  56 n.a. 1 14 0 29
75  1990 2  57 1 1 14 2 25
72  1991 2  53 1 1 14 3 28
60  1992 1  44 1 1 12 3 40
64  1993 1  46 1 2 13 3 36
64  1994 2  46 1 2 11 3 36
76  1995 2  55 1 5 12 3 24
75  1996 2  56 1 4 11 3 25
76  1997 2  46 2 5 18 3 24
78  1998 2  55 1 4 13 3 22
74  1999 1  49 1 5 14 3 26
69  2000 2  42 2 6 14 4 31
66  2001 3  37 1 4 16 4 34
67  2002 1  47 2 2 12 4 33
55  2003 1  43 4 2 n.a. 5 45
56  2004 1  47 4 n.a. n.a. 4 44
53  2005 1  49  n.a. n.a. n.a. 3 47
 
a At farmgate undistorted prices 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet. 
 